http://www.eurosduvillage.eu/Galileo-Un-veritable-parcours-du,3282
Launched ten years ago, Galileo has experienced many ups and downs ... and still counting.
After difficult negotiations with the United States to impose Galileo, the failure of public-private partnership for the deployment and operation of the program, the divisions on dual-use - civilian and military - and the technical difficulties encountered during development and in-orbit validation of Galileo, the EU now sees China compromise his ambition to issue encrypted signals, while fiscal slippages ahead ... The time is now more than ever the mobilization behind the Commission, whose task is challenging and unusual role.
A decade of trials to repeat a program for highly strategic
Some observers have called Galileo "single infrastructure project (U. Mörth). That would have been so simple ... In fact, Galileo, the European satellite navigation, has since the start of a highly strategic for the EU. Composed term of thirty satellites orbiting at medium altitude in three different orbits, plus forty ground stations, Galileo is intended to ensure the independence of the EU as a key area for both its security and to the economy of tomorrow. Designed by the European Space Agency (ESA), an intergovernmental organization, Galileo should send signals to high accuracy - about two meters, against 20 for the open service of current GPS - to provide assurances of integrity or deliver encrypted signals - that is to say, strongly protected against possible attempts of interference.
The first obstacle to the smooth running of the program came from across the Atlantic. The United States, almost hegemonic in the field of satellite navigation - Glonass, the Russian system is much less efficient than the GPS - have resisted until 2004 that Galileo could make encrypted signals.
Washington would indeed preserve its ability to be able to jam the signals of all the competing GPS systems, and this for national security. Finally, the EU and the United States reached an agreement, the latter accepting a superposition of Galileo's encrypted signal on frequencies used by GPS in exchange for the ability to jam signals unencrypted Galileo at any time.
Furthermore, a second obstacle - the effects much more dramatic for the EU - has led to opposition from some member states - the United Kingdom and the Netherlands mainly - to a fully public financing program. Therefore, the Commission had no choice but to propose a public-private partnership to implement the deployment - the construction and putting into orbit satellites mainly - and exploitation program. However, this strategy has proved a failure, the private consortium selected refusing a transfer of technological and economic risks are considered excessive. Chosen in 1999, this strategy was abandoned in 2008 following a "cry of alarm" to the European Commission reached a year earlier. The Council and Parliament have agreed then, facing the threat of the program to replace EU funding than expected private sector, or 3.4 billion euros.
Then Galileo has seen its implementation delayed due to procrastination on its possible dual-use. While officially only a "civilian purposes under civilian control" have been considered since the program's inception, several member states, including France, wanted to use Galileo for military purposes. Why, indeed, refrain from having full use of a system that is funded and which one is the master? And yet, this is what should take place, because the veto of the United Kingdom that Galileo is used by Member States for military purposes. Opposed to what Galileo can provide encrypted signals until 2004, London has agreed to lift its opposition on condition that these signals may in no circumstances be used for military purposes.
In the current debate in the Council, Galileo should not be used for military purposes. Galileo is the initial system of satellite navigation to civilian use only. The encrypted signals of Galileo, they actually see the day, would therefore only used for the exercise of the powers of public non-military, like the surveillance monitoring of immigration and external borders of Tracking the movement of inmates receiving of semi-freedom.
This position reflects the will of the United Kingdom as GPS preserve its monopoly in this area ... Judging this absurd situation, several member states continue to request that Galileo could be used for military purposes, without success, even if the United Kingdom has accepted "civil use by the military." Thus, the armies could use the encrypted signals of Galileo for logistics, but in no case to guide missiles or to conduct military operations. The debate is not over, more than ten years after being introduced ...
Finally, the implementation of the program has been slowed by technical difficulties encountered by manufacturers in the development phase and in-orbit validation of the program. These difficulties have mainly involved the manufacture of the second satellite of the constellation, GIOVE-B.
The "rescue" of Galileo in 2008 has led some scholars to contend, like Laurence Nardon of IFRI, that "we may finally be optimistic about the future of the program. If the program's future may indeed be viewed with more optimism today, Galileo has not finished his assault course.
New sprint or marathon? A strong pressure on the Commission
The change of strategy to complete Galileo in 2008 was accompanied by a strengthening of the role of the Commission, now owner, while ESA has been assigned the role of prime contractor. An unprecedented public governance, ad hoc, has been established with all the uncertainties that entails. The "Space Policy of the EU" has not waited for the Lisbon Treaty to deal with major institutional changes!
Now real driver of Galileo, although member states maintain a central position in the Supervisory Board of the program, the Commission sees two profiling zones consequent turbulence on its horizon.
The second involves risk of fiscal slippages in the procurement for the deployment and operation of the program. Overruns or under-estimation by the Commission of the amount of contracts - in conscience or in error? Or simply characteristic common to all space programs, which is always difficult to anticipate the costs? Negotiating bilaterally with prequalified consortia of industrial partners or with individual - eg Arianespace for the lot devoted to launchers - the Commission does not seem to be able to impose its "price". According to some sources, an extension of 600 million euros to 1.3 billion would be even necessary, implying a further modification of the MFF even though the 2008 agreement was obtained with difficulty.
The second barrier may cause more noise than the first, although its impacts for the EU are not commensurate with those resulting from the failure of the EU to reach an agreement with China.
e time for cooperation is now far ... Without access to key technologies for Galileo and does not give light place in the governance of the program, China has decided to develop its own system. And she is not alone, since India and Japan have also followed this path. This excitement may cause many conflicts in the near future, the number of available frequencies to transmit signals to satellite navigation being very small.
For example, the effort "exception" granted by the European Parliament and Council in 2008 to save the program represented an amount less than 0.03% of EU GDP. We must therefore keep a sense of proportion, although it should of course ensure that the fiscal management of the program is optimal. Put the Commission on the dock at a time when it tries to complete the final sprint of the program would be detrimental to the interests of the EU not only in the medium and long terms, but also in the immediate future.
Become a great space power can not be a long quiet river
The Lisbon Treaty will, for the first time, give jurisdiction to the EU in space. Surprisingly indeed, the existing treaties do not contain legal basis providing the opportunity for the EU to pursue space programs. The Union was thus forced to finance Galileo - as GMES and EGNOS - through other policies, mainly through the research. The Reform Treaty puts an end to this gap, providing a shared competence of the EU in space and providing a "European Space Policy" and "space programs.
The new role of the EU Commission in the field space has been particularly emphasized by Galileo, it is also itself innovative in many respects. Thus, it was the first time that the Commission and the Community flew an industrial program and that it would become the owner of an industrial infrastructure, the first time the Commission has piloted space program, the first time that 'pay for use of radio navigation signals by satellite was planned, the first such program was intended as a civilian and as being conducted by involving third States in its governance. If we add to that - and ignoring the many technological innovations developed by ESA - the fact that the EU has first tried to use a PPP ... we better understand the scope of responsibilities the European Commission.
Hopefully the new form of public governance, development will be effective and sustainable, and that the EU will manage to overcome the new obstacles that remain consistent and could yet emerge in the final stretch of Galileo. Fortunately, the progressive deployment of EGNOS since October 2009, Galileo's precursor - the system would improve the accuracy and reliability of GPS - demonstrates the ability of the EU to move in space.
